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The influx of migrants to Germany and the conclusion of an agreement between the Europe-
an Union and Turkey intended at stopping migrants from coming to the EU have shown that 
Germany’s internal policy is being increasingly influenced by decisions made by the Turkish 
government. The agreement might have introduced new dynamics to German-Turkish rela-
tions and brought about closer co-operation between the two countries but the situation 
became seriously complicated following a failed coup d’état in Turkey in July 2016 and Presi-
dent Erdogan’s response to it. Mass arrests and repression in Turkey are seen in Germany as 
an instrument of consolidation of Erdogan’s power, which is increasingly morphing into an 
oppressive authoritarian regime. Turkey’s plan to change the country’s constitution and to 
hold a referendum on it is perceived in this context.
The three million-strong Turkish diaspora in Germany, of whom nearly a half have the right 
to vote, makes bilateral relations between the two countries important. Campaigns ahead of 
subsequent elections in Turkey increasingly lead to the transferral of Turkey’s internal conflicts 
to Germany and spark tensions between Berlin and Ankara. Recently, the dispute has grown 
fiercer because of a referendum campaign in Turkey which Turkish politicians are also running 
in Germany. As for Germany, the Bundestag election campaign has begun and public opinion 
is calling on the government to take firm action and to condemn the political purges in Turkey, 
which have also extended to those with dual German-Turkish citizenship. Chancellor Merkel 
has been forced to act with more determination towards Turkey while seeking an agreement 
regarding migration issues, security policy and the fight against terrorism. Her task will be 
made more difficult not only due to the Turkish government’s confrontational attitude but 
also due to pressure from the Social Democrats and opposition parties in Germany.
The critical factors  
in German-Turkish relations 
The Turkish community in Germany is the factor 
which bears the largest impact on German-Tur-
kish relations. It comes ahead of strong econo-
mic ties and security co-operation. It is estima-
ted1 that approximately three million people 
1 C. Sydow, Debatte über den Doppelpass – das sind die 
Fakten, Der Spiegel, 5.08.2016, http://www.spiegel.de/
politik/deutschland/deutschtuerken-doppelte-staatsbu-
ergerschaft-das-sind-die-fakten-a-1106363.html 
of Turkish descent live in Germany, of whom 
2.1 million hold Turkish citizenship. This has 
a direct bearing on Germany’s internal policy. 
Firstly, following many years of disputes and 
despite fears of loyalty to the German state, in 
2014 Germany introduced the right to hold dual 
citizenship for children from immigrant families 
born in Germany. This was meant to strengthen 
the ties which young Turkish people have with 
Germany. Intensive election campaigns are held 
by Turkish politicians, which both divides the Tur-
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kish community and also leads to chasms on the 
German political scene. Furthermore, Turkey’s 
internal conflicts are increasingly being carried 
over to Germany with demonstrations and even 
riots occurring (such as the ones on May 2015 
in Karlsruhe, pitting supporters and opponents 
of President Erdogan against each other). In the 
Bundestag, issues regarding Turkey’s politics 
are gaining particular importance, which has 
been manifested by tensions around the com-
memoration of the massacre of Armenians2. 
The armed conflict between Turkey and the 
Kurdish terrorist organisation PKK has a direct 
impact on Germany’s internal security. With 
the intensification of the fighting against the 
PKK in Turkey, clashes between supporters and 
opponents of the two parties are also escala-
ting (for example, the riots in March 2016 in 
Duisburg or in April 2016 in Cologne, Hamburg 
and Stuttgart). The German counter-intelligen-
ce has expressed concerns at these events3. The 
2 In response to the Bundestag’s resolution of June 2016 
which commemorated the massacre of Armenians, the 
government in Ankara did not issue entrance permits for 
German politicians who wanted to visit the base in Incirlik 
where Bundeswehr troops are stationed. The dispute was 
resolved after the German government spokesman admit-
ted that the resolution was not legally binding and was 
only an expression of the parliament’s opinion. It was An-
gela Merkel who insisted on this clarification as a precon-
dition for letting German parliamentarians enter Turkey. 
There were voices in Germany arguing that it is necessary 
to change the location of the base and to remove it from 
Turkey. However, towards the end of November, Chancel-
lor Merkel made it clear that the base’s current location 
should not be disputed and that Germany is not intending 
to move its troops elsewhere (to Jordan, Kuwait or Cyprus). 
3 Spannungen zwischen rechtsextremistischen / nationa-
listischen Türken und Anhängern der PKK in Deutsch-
land, BfV-Newsletter No. 2/2016 – Thema 6, https://
www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/
newsletter/newsletter-archive/bfv-newsletter-archiv/
bfv-newsletter-2016-2/bfv-newsletter-2016-02-06 
German security services have been warning 
against the influence the Turkish intelligence 
agency (MIT) has in Germany; the warnings 
have applied above all to manipulations of Ger-
man public opinion with false information and 
the repression which MIT uses against Turkish 
opposition figures living in Germany4. 
German-Turkish relations are also shaped by 
strong economic ties. Germany is Turkey’s most 
important trading partner. One tenth of Turkey’s 
exports go to Germany totalling approximately 
14 billion euros. There are approximately 6,200 
German companies in Turkey and their trade in 
2015 amounted to 37 billion euros5. Turkey’s 
attractiveness in terms of tourism is also signi-
ficant—in 2015 approximately 5.5 million Ger-
mans visited Turkey, which represents 15% of 
all foreign tourists. However, both terrorist at-
tacks and the failed coup have contributed to 
limiting the number of tourists in Turkey. 
Turkey, as a NATO member state, is one of 
Germany’s key partners in the area of security 
issues. The Bundeswehr troops engaged in the 
resolution of the Syrian conflict are stationed in 
the Turkish town of Incirlik6. The police forces 
of both countries work together to stop people 
smuggling. Germany and Turkey have also dec-
lared they are willing to fight against terrorism 
together (11 Germans were killed in the attack 
in Istanbul in January 2016 and two Germans in 
January this year). However, the close relations 
and their special character have not changed 
Germany’s negative position on Turkey’s EU 
membership (see Appendix 1).
4 The counter-intelligence has set up a special group in 
order to monitor MIT’s activity in Germany. Compa-
re, Gezielte Falschmeldungen aus Ankara?, 2.12.2016, 
https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/tuerkischer-geheim-
dienst-101.html 
5 Türkei: Beziehungen zu Deutschland, January 2017, 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/sid_0ED526BFF-
BA9DBF066787F24FE6D39DB/DE/Aussenpolitik /Laen-
der/Laenderinfos/Tuerkei/Bilateral_node.html#doc-
336370bodyText3 
6 J. Gotkowska, K. Frymark, Germany’s engagement in 
the resolution of the Syrian conflict, OSW Commen-
tary, 25.01.2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publik-
acje/osw-commentary/2016-01-25/germanys-engage-
ment-resolution-syrian-conflict
In Germany intensive election campaigns 
are being held for Turkish politicians, 
which not only leads to divisions in Turk-
ish society, it also contributes to chasms 
on the German political scene.
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The migration agreement 
and Turkey’s increased assertiveness 
Co-operation between Berlin and Ankara has 
been strengthened in the face of the migration 
crisis. The influx of refugees to Europe, and in 
2015 particularly to Germany, has forced the 
government of Angela Merkel to work with 
President Erdogan more intensively. For Mer-
kel the priority has been to limit the number of 
immigrants arriving in Germany due to incre-
asingly serious political and social problems in 
the context of the migration crisis in Germany. 
Co-operation between Germany and Turkey 
culminated in the first intergovernmental con-
sultations which were held in January 2016 
(Berlin holds such consultations with Germany’s 
11 most important partners). The consultations 
were preceded by the visit of Chancellor Merkel 
during the Turkish election campaign (October 
2015) which was interpreted as an expression 
of support for President Erdogan’s party. 
The agreement between the EU and Turkey (si-
gned in March 2016), apart from the immediate 
objective to reduce the migration pressure to Eu-
rope, might have strengthened German-Turkish 
relations and become the driving force behind 
them. However, despite Germany’s expectations, 
the agreement has become the source of mutu-
al accusations and has provided the impulse for 
a dispute. Turkey has reproached the EU for not 
disbursing the promised funding (6 billion eu-
ros by 2018) and the lack of will to deliver on its 
promise to liberalise the visa regime for Turkish 
citizens. Germany has stated that it will fulfil its 
promise only when Turkey meets all requirements 
set by the European Commission. Ankara’s oppo-
sition to introducing the changes in the Turkish 
anti-terrorism law, which the EU had called for, 
has become the main bone of contention7. 
Although Turkey has threatened to break off 
the agreement with the EU on many occasions, 
it is still in force8. The synergy of the two pro-
cesses has contributed to alleviating the migra-
tion pressure; the EU-Turkey agreement and 
better border controls of the Balkan migration 
route9. Should Turkey breach the agreement, 
the German Ministry of Finance has drafted 
a plan which allows for tight border controls 
on the Balkan route and on selected borders 
in the Schengen zone. A temporary exclusion 
of Greece from the Schengen zone would also 
be considered. Germany would opt for full pro-
tection of the maritime border between Turkey 
and Greece by the European Border and Coastal 
Guard. Additionally, other corrective measures 
would be taken should the agreement with Tur-
key fall apart, such as the establishment of new 
temporary camps for refugees in Greece. Ger-
many also has high hopes regarding the quotas 
of refugees the EU member states would take 
in, believing that financial sanctions would be 
used in order to force the EU countries to agree 
to adopt this mechanism10. 
7 M. Chudziak, Turkey/EU: playing hardball on visa lib-
eralisation, OSW Analyses, 11.05.2016, https://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-05-11/turkey/
eu-playing-hardball-visa-liberalisation 
8 See e.g. Turkey’s EU minister says migrant readmis-
sions may end without visa deal, 18.10.2016 http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-turkey-
idUSKCN12I26L 
9 Both processes are overlapping and on the one hand 
prove that Turkey is determined to patrol its own coast 
and to combat smugglers (since 20th March 2016 when 
the EU-Turkey agreement came into force, the number 
of migrants arriving from Turkey to the Greek islands has 
fallen by as much as 97%, according to Frontex). On the 
other hand, sending the message, that has spread rapid-
ly in social media, about tighter controls on the Balkan 
route has contributed to reducing the migration pressure.
10 Compare, Bundesregierung plant für mögliches Scheitern 
des Flüchtlingsdeals, 19.08.2016, http://www.spiegel.de 
Berlin is concerned about migrants from Africa who are 
arriving in Italy and possibly moving on to Germany. Ger-
many is determined to strengthen the internal borders of 
African countries; this was the purpose of Angela Merkel’s 
visit to Niger and Mali in October 2016 and to Tunisia and 
Egypt in February and March this year. See K. Frymark, Ger-
many wants migrants to remain in Africa, OSW Analyses, 
19.10.2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl 
The EU-Turkey agreement, apart from the 
immediate objective to reduce the mi-
gration pressure in Europe, might have 
strengthened German-Turkish relations and 
become the driving force behind it.
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Even though Germany has prepared solu-
tions that would be implemented should the 
agreement be breached, the deal with Turkey 
is of great political importance to Germany. 
It allows Germany to maintain the narrative 
about the ‘European regulation’ of the migra-
tion crisis which does not exclude any country, 
contrary to stepping up border controls on the 
Balkan route in the teeth of Greek opposition. 
The agreement also proves that Chancellor 
Merkel is committed to limiting the number 
of refugees arriving in Germany. Attention has 
been drawn to the positive role she has played 
in resolving this stage of the migration crisis, 
in particular ahead of the Bundestag election 
scheduled for September this year.  
A change following the failed coup
The crisis in relations between Germany and Tur-
key came in response to President Erdogan’s re-
action to the attempted coup d’état in Turkey in 
July 2016. Germany perceives the measures he 
has taken in retaliation as actions serving above 
all to consolidate his power. While Germany has 
condemned the coup plotters, Turkey believes it 
has done so rather reluctantly and Angela Mer-
kel was not prepared to personally support Pre-
sident Erdogan. Furthermore, Germany refuses 
to provide Turkey with information about people 
and institutions allegedly linked to the Fethul-
lah Gülen movement; Turkey accuses Gülen of 
preparing the coup11. Turkey has for a long time 
11 J. Diehl, Wie die Türkei deutsche Sicherheitsbehör-
den bedrängt, Der Spiegel, 21.02.2017, http://www.
spiegel.de/politik /deutschland/fethullah-guelen-tu-
erkei-uebt-druck-auf-deutsche-sicherheitsbehoer-
den-aus-a-1135448.html 
been accusing Germany of tolerating the activi-
ty of terrorist organisations in Germany (e.g. the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the PKK) and of the 
‘insubordination’ of the German television sta-
tion which broadcast a vulgar poem ridiculing 
Erdogan. Germany has frequently criticised the 
violation of democracy in Turkey, Erdogan’s ruth-
less fight against the PKK and Turkey’s influence 
on the Turkish diaspora in Germany. In 2016 the 
German ambassador to Ankara was summoned 
to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs three 
times and Turkey temporarily withdrew its repre-
sentative in Berlin.
German criticism of Turkey reached its peaked 
following Ankara’s arrest of six German citi-
zens, among them a Die Welt journalist Deniz 
Yücel, as part of Turkey’s fight against the coup 
plotters12. Turkey has accused him of spreading 
terror and inciting hatred, and President Erdo-
gan has publicly charged him with espionage 
for Germany. Germany has rather limited pos-
sibilities to help its citizens since four of them 
(including Yücel) also hold Turkish citizenship 
and Turkey considers them to be solely Turkish 
citizens (deprived of the right to consular pro-
tection). In addition, relations between the two 
countries have been affected by an increased 
number of applications for asylum submitted 
by Turkish citizens in Germany. Between Janu-
ary and November 2016 5,166 people, inclu-
ding140 diplomats and Turkish military officials 
stationed in NATO bases in Germany, applied 
for asylum in Germany13. Previously approxi-
mately 1,800 applications were submitted per 
year. The secretary of state in the German Mini-
stry of Foreign Affairs, Michael Roth (SPD), dec-
lared that Germany would ‘support all critics of 
the regime in Turkey’. This provided a certain 
level of encouragement to seek asylum in Ger-
12 Sechs Deutsche in türkischer Haft, FAZ, 1.03.2017,   
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik /ausland/neben-de-
niz-yuecel-sind-5-weitere-deutsche-in-tuerkischer-
haft-14904655.html 
13 Mehr türkische Diplomaten bitten um Asyl, http://www.
tagesschau.de/ausland/tuerkei-diplomaten-asyl-101.html 
The German criticism of Turkey reached 
its peak after Ankara arrested six German 
citizens, among them a Die Welt journalist, 
Deniz Yücel.
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many14. Germany’s accusations of Turkey sup-
porting terrorism have only added fuel to the 
fire. They leaked from the German Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’ internal documents in August 
2016 and led to another escalation in tensions 
between Berlin and Ankara15. 
Germany – a vital constituency in the 
Turkish election 
The German-Turkish crisis caused by Erdogan’s 
reaction to the coup attempt and Turkey’s un-
precedented verbal aggression towards German 
politicians has been the most serious in years 
and has grown stronger with the election cam-
paign16. It also has an impact on the develop-
ment of the Bundestag election campaign in 
Germany. 
For Turkey, Germany is one of the vital constitu-
encies–after Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir it is the 
fourth largest constituency with approximate-
ly 1.4 million people having the right to vote17. 
In the constitutional referendum in Turkey 
14 Deutschland bietet verfolgten Türken Asyl an, 8.11.2016, 
http://www.zeit.de/politik /deutschland/2016-11/aus-
waertiges-amt-tuerkei-asyl-angebot 
15 When this classified document was leaked, the dispute 
between the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Chancellor’s Office over the assessment of the threat 
from the Middle Eastern countries once again surfaced. 
The ministry distanced itself from the accusation that 
Turkey supports terrorism (the ministry, contrary to the 
usual situation, had not been included in the process of 
developing the assessment). In February 2016 the Ger-
man Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not approve the as-
sessment prepared by the Chancellor’s Office regarding 
Saudi Arabia, with which it had developed close co-op-
eration. According to the assessment Riyadh was a de-
stabilising factor in the region.
16 11 members of parliament from the Left Party were grant-
ed police protection since they had received threats after 
voting in favour of the Bundestag resolution which quali-
fied the massacre of Armenians as genocide. The German 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in a report that has not been 
made public) discouraged German politicians of Turkish 
descent from visiting Turkey due to the inability to guaran-
tee them safety. Compare, Drohungen: Türkischstämmige 
Bundestagsabgeordnete unter Polizeischutz, 12.06.2016, 
http://www.deutsch-tuerkische-nachrichten.de 
17 Since the 2014 presidential election in Turkey the Turkish 
diaspora in Germany can vote not only in consular estab-
lishments but also in specially established halls (e.g. at 
the Olympic Stadium in Berlin), which facilitates voting 
and increases turnout. 
scheduled on 16th April the vote from Germa-
ny may tip the balance since surveys regard-
ing support for constitutional changes advo-
cated by the Turkish president indicate that 
he does not have a clear majority18. He could 
gain dominance due to the vote of Turks living 
in Germany since in the previous elections the 
majority of them had backed the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP). In the 2015 par-
liamentary election the support for the rul-
ing party reached 60%, which was the high-
est figure outside Turkey. Two organisations, 
in practice closely affiliated to the AKP, serve 
Erdogan in his efforts to mobilise Turkish 
voters in Germany: the Union of European 
Turkish Democrats (UETD) and the Turkish 
Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB, see 
Appendix 2).
In Germany speeches made by politicians from 
Ankara are the most important element in the 
mobilisation of Turkish voters. At the beginning 
of March several Turkish ministers were for-
bidden to make election speeches in Germany, 
on the pretext of a legal restriction regarding 
the security of public gatherings. The decisions 
were made by the local governments (includ-
18 As part of the constitutional changes the present parlia-
mentary system will shift to a presidential system under 
which the president will be granted full executive power, 
and the competences of parliament, the judicial system 
and supervisory institutions will be substantially reduced. 
The reform of the political system is set to be the culmina-
tion of the long-lasting efforts of the ruling party and Pres-
ident Erdogan to change the political structure of the state. 
See, M. Chudziak, Constitutional reform in Turkey: the Pres-
ident takes it all, OSW Analyses, 25.01.2017, https://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2017-01-25/constitu-
tional-reform-turkey-president-takes-it-all 
For Turkey, Germany is one of its key con-
stituencies. After Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir 
it is the fourth largest constituency in terms 
of the number of voters, with approximately 
1.4 million people who have the right to vote.
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ing those in Cologne and Gaggenau), where 
election rallies were scheduled to be held. The 
states and opposition politicians criticised the 
federal government for shifting responsibil-
ity for foreign policy onto local governments. 
Previously, despite a series of controversial 
statements, the election rallies for Turks had 
been tolerated by the government in Berlin19. 
This approach changed with Germany’s grow-
ing concern with the transformation of Turkey’s 
political system, the intensifying aggressive-
ness of Turkish rallies, and the ongoing election 
campaign in Turkey. The German government is 
worried both about the loyalty of citizens hold-
ing dual citizenship, and that a large section of 
the German public opinion will interpret the 
agreement for Turkish election campaigns to 
be held in Germany as an expression of support 
for authoritarian changes in Turkey. 
Although the German government is critical 
of the development of the internal situation in 
Turkey and considers Turkish verbal attacks to 
be ‘unacceptable’, in the context of the ongo-
ing election campaign in Germany there is no 
coherent position on Turkish activities in Ger-
many. Chancellor Merkel will have to choose 
between criticising Turkey more strongly, which 
the majority of German society would expect, 
19 The controversies caused by President Erdogan’s speech-
es were linked to his words in: Cologne in 2008 where 
he stated that “assimilation is a crime against humanity’ 
and in 2011 in Düsseldorf where he claimed that ‘Turk-
ish children should first learn Turkish, then German’. 
Both statements he made have led to protests from 
German politicians. Erdoğans Rede erzürnt deutsche 
Politiker, Die Welt, 28.02.2011, https://www.welt.de/
politik/deutschland/article12665248/Erdoğans-Rede-er-
zuernt-deutsche-Politiker.html 
and appeasing the partner which is important 
for Germany’s migration and security policies 
in the Middle East. 81% of Germans believe 
that Berlin should be firmer in responding to 
Turkey’s activities (the survey conducted by 
Emnid on 5th March this year). However, in the 
opinion of Chancellor Merkel, an excessively 
severe criticism of the measures undertaken by 
President Erdogan may be counter-productive 
and strengthen support for the changes in Tur-
key’s political system in the Turkish diaspora in 
Germany. The lack of a firm reaction will cause 
suspicions that Chancellor Merkel is dependent 
on Turkey, which may have a particularly neg-
ative impact on the result of the CDU in this 
year’s election. For these reasons Chancellor 
Merkel dismissed President Erdogan’s compari-
son of Germany’s actions to the practices of the 
‘national-socialist government’ as ‘absurd and 
misplaced’20 and the head of the Chancellor’s 
Office, Peter Altmaier, threatened to prohibit 
election rallies organised by Turkish politicians 
in Germany21. The SPD, the CDU’s main rival 
in the parliamentary election and its coalition 
partner, has been using speeches made by Turk-
ish politicians in its election campaign. The SPD 
(among them foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel 
and justice minister Heiko Maas) are trying to 
set themselves apart from Chancellor Merkel’s 
position, which to date has been quite bal-
anced, by firmly criticising Turkish politicians. 
The CSU, the Green Party and the Left Party 
hold a similar position, calling for a complete 
ban on election presentations by Turkish politi-
cians. The Turkish diaspora in Germany usually 
votes for the SPD but, due to the small percent-
age of this group among all eligible voters in 
Germany (approximately 2%), its preferences 
do not have a real impact on election results in 
Germany. 
20 Bundesregierung weist NS-Vergleich zurück, 9.03.2017, 
https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content /DE/Arti-
kel/2017/03/2017-03-06-deutsch-tuerkisches-verhaelt-
nis.html 
21 Kanzleramtschef droht türkischen Politikern mit Einreise-
verbot, 15.03.2017, http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/20 
17-03/peter-altmaier-tuerkei-einreiseverbot-wahlkampf 
Chancellor Merkel will have to choose be-
tween criticising Turkey more strongly, 
which the majority of German society would 
expect, and appeasing a partner which is 
important for Germany’s migration and se-
curity policies in the Middle East.
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The outlook: 
the conflict is in nobody’s interest 
In the medium term German-Turkish relations 
will be shaped both by growing distrust and 
the necessity for close co-operation in select-
ed areas. Apart from the economy, this applies 
above all to preserving the migration agree-
ment since it would be costly for Chancellor 
Merkel in political terms if Turkey terminated it 
before the election in Germany. Other areas of 
further co-operation will encompass attempts 
to resolve the conflict in Syria, limiting the 
smuggling of migrants, and the fight against 
terrorist groups. The growing scepticism to-
wards the changes occurring in Turkey will not 
rule out co-operation in selected sectors. Fur-
ther co-operation will be based on the present 
modus vivendi because there is no hope that 
the government in Ankara will change in the 
short term and that Turkey’s policy towards the 
EU will be revised.
Germany will also opt for a continuation of 
the EU-Turkey accession negotiations since it 
treats that as one of the few instruments of 
pressure in order to change Turkey’s policy. 
However, for a section of German politicians, 
Turkey’s authoritarian tendencies prove that 
Ankara should not join the EU and this is caus-
ing further tensions between the two capitals. 
While negotiating the migration agreement, 
Germany has for the first time been confronted 
with Turkey’s perspective of negotiating from 
a position of strength and Germany was not 
prepared for this. Ankara may use this model of 
talks in further negotiations with Germany and 
take advantage of the Turkish minority in Ger-
many in order to make threats and to escalate 
tensions between the two countries. Germa-
ny also fears the intensified activity of Turkish 
organisations in Germany closely affiliated to 
Erdogan, and their impact on Germany’s inter-
nal policy. Merkel, who was accused of being 
submissive towards Turkey last year, will be 
forced to show more assertiveness in the elec-
tion year. She will thus try to demonstrate her 
independence and to consolidate her voters, 
who are critical of Erdogan, and limit their de-
fection to other parties. Seeing the need to have 
more room for manoeuvre in its relations with 
Turkey, Germany will be inclined to increase its 
involvement in stepping up the security of EU 
borders and maintaining effective border con-
trols along the Balkan migration route. Addi-
tionally, in order to put Ankara under pressure, 
Germany will use the instruments of develop-
ment assistance and financial support, which 
are quite important for Turkey.
APPENDIX 
1. Germany and Turkey’s membership in the EU 
Turkey has been seeking EU membership since 1963 when it gained the status of associated member. 
Accession aspirations have been shaping Turkey’s co-operation with the EU, including with Germany, 
since the beginning. Chancellor Angela Merkel is sceptical of Turkey’s EU membership and for this 
reason Germany has been blocking the opening of subsequent negotiation chapters with Ankara (ne-
gotiations started in 2005). Berlin has agreed for the accession negotiations to be accelerated as part 
of the migration deal, but does however remain opposed to Turkey joining the EU. In Germany two 
approaches to Turkey’s EU membership can be distinguished. In the first one, closer to Chancellor Mer-
kel’s party line, Turkey’s accession to the EU should be replaced with ‘privileged partnership’ with the 
EU. The Social Democrats, the Green Party and the Left Party hold the second position, which is more 
in favour of Turkey’s EU membership. They opt for Turkey’s full accession to the EU. The approach of 
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these parties to Turkey’s accession to the EU may lead Germany to open further negotiation chapters 
should these parties form a coalition following the parliamentary election in 2017.
Germany is not ready to make negotiations concessions to Turkey due to the migration agreement. 
In Berlin there are suggestions that, given Brexit and the possible changes in the EU, two circles of 
EU integration should be established. The first one would be reserved for current EU members, and 
the second circle could group together the UK and Norway and also Turkey. The member states in 
the second circle would gain access to the common market and to security co-operation, including 
the prevention of illegal migration. In exchange for this Turkey would contribute to the EU budget, 
but without the full right to participate in making decisions as these would be excluded from the 
second circle of EU integration1. This solution would be an intermediate form of EU membership and 
it would fulfil Turkey’s ‘privileged partnership’ with the EU. 
The German government has also not agreed to the acceleration of the liberalisation of the visa regi-
me between the EU and Turkey without Turkey meeting all the conditions required by the European 
Commission. German society also supports this stance. 69% of the respondents demand that the 
talks about the liberalisation of the visa regime with Turkey be stopped (according to a survey con-
ducted by ARD-DeutschlandTrend in August 2016). The bone of contention is Ankara’s opposition to 
introducing changes in the anti-terrorism law, which is required by the EU2. It is quite unlikely that 
the visa requirement for Turks will be lifted before the Bundestag election to be held in September 
2017. For Germany the liberalisation of the visa regime presents an increased risk of illegal migration 
and, consequently, a threat to its welfare system. The prerequisite for changing the current visa 
regulations will be an additional requirement to introduce a mechanism which will make it possible 
to temporarily suspend the liberalisation of the visa regime should the new system be abused. The 
adoption of an identical provision by the European Parliament was necessary in order to liberalise 
the visa regimes for Ukraine and Georgia in 2016.
2. Activity of UETD and DITIB in Germany
The Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD) and the Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs 
(DITIB) are the most important Turkish organisations in Germany, and are closely affiliated to Presi-
dent Erdogan’s party. DITIB is formally affiliated to the state institution the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs, not directly with the AKP. Both organisations have their headquarters in Cologne. UEDT is 
above all politically-oriented, it organises rallies of Turkish AKP politicians in Germany, among its 
other activities. DITIB is a religious organisation and groups together approximately 900 mosques 
(out of a total of 2,350 mosques in Germany). A section of German politicians (among them Armin 
Schuster from the CDU, a member of the Committee on Special Services, and Volker Beck from the 
Green Party) reproach the two organisations for strengthening the AKP’s ascendancy in Germany, 
running campaigns against German members of parliament voting in favour of the Bundestag reso-
lution regarding the genocide of Armenians, and spying on associates working with Fethullah Gülen 
(whom Ankara accuses of initiating the coup attempt in July 2016). In January 2017 Germany’s pro-
secutor general launched an investigation into the DITIB’s espionage for Turkey3.
1 Europe after Brexit: A proposal for a continental partnership, 29.08.2016, http://bruegel.org/2016/08/europe-after-brex-
it-a-proposal-for-a-continental-partnership/ 
2 M. Chudziak, Turkey/EU: playing hardball on visa liberalisation, OSW Analyses, 11.05.2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/analyses/2016-05-11/turkey/eu-playing-hardball-visa-liberalisation 
3 Imame spionieren in Deutschland, NZZ, 25.02.2017, https://www.nzz.ch/feuilleton/imame-spionieren-in-deutschland-
du-sollst-nicht-spitzeln-ld.147588 Por. również Erdoğans Einfluss in Deutschland ist riesig, 9.06.2016, http://www.
dw.com/de/Erdoğans-einfluss-in-deutschland-ist-riesig/a-19317938 and Erdoğans Lobby in Deutschland, 7.06.2016, 
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/themen/agenda/einfluss-der-tuerkei-Erdoğans-lobby-in-deutschland/13695612.html
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3. Trade between Germany and Turkey 
4. Public opinion survey regarding the Turkish referendum campaign in Germany 
Own analysis based on data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany
Source: Forsa Institute (Analysis for Stern Magazine, March 2017)
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